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The Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations  (MTN) is
scheduled to  conclude  in December,  1990.  Whether  it will be regarded as  a
successful round of  talks depends in part on the negotiations in
agriculture, which have proven as difficult as many predicted.  This paper
considers  three rather different aspects of the agricultural negotiations.
First, what is  the  "core" of agreement most likely to  emerge in
agriculture, especially between the major antagonists:  the U.S.  and
European Community?  Second, how will the domestic politics of  the  1990
Farm Bill  interact with the negotiating process?  Third,  in what ways will
the results of the Uruguay Round condition subsequent rounds  of MTNs  under
the General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade?
In brief, I will argue firstly that a "framework agreement" in
agriculture will emerge, which closely resembles the conception put
forward  in the most recent proposals of  the U.S. and Cairns Group.
*A paper prepared for a conference on the  "Political Economy of North
American Agriculture,"  Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, March 8-9,  1990.
**Special Assistant to  the U.S. Ambassador to  the General Agreement on
Tariffs  and Trade, 1987-88.Whether this framework results  in substantive reductions  in levels of
protection depends  at its  core on the willingness of the U.S.  to  reduce and
eventually to eliminate export subsidies in return for substantial
reductions  in the level of export restitutions paid by the EC.  While
difficult, some are currently optimistic about the chances, even for
tariffication and "rebalancing".  Secondly, the  1990 Farm Bill will produce
incremental movements  in the direction of  "decoupling",  cloaked in  the
language of "flexibility",  regardless  of the  outcome of the Uruguay Round.
These modest reforms will reinforce the U.S. position in GATT.  However,
more substantive movements  in the direction of  "tariffication"  are likely
to be opposed by the  domestic sugar, dairy and peanut lobbies,  in spite of
some evidence  that  they might gain  from a conversion of quotas  to  tariffs.
In addition, Congress will  be likely to  demand authorization of a "war
chest" of retaliatory measures  in case the GATT  talks proceed
unsatisfactorily.  Thirdly, the Uruguay Round has ushered in a new complex
of nontariff trade barriers  (NTB's) that are likely to  grow in importance
in future trade negotiations.  These new NTB's  involve  the use of health,
safety and environmental regulations as  effective barriers to  trade:  what
I call  "ecoprotectionism".  Several recent cases,  including the hormones
dispute between the U.S.  and EC,  and a more  recent U.S.--Canada dispute
over  landing requirements for Pacific Coast salmon and herring,  provide
glimpses of this growing threat to  liberal international trade.
Framework Agreement and What Else Besides?
In the  latter part  of 1989,  the U.S. put forward its  final proposal
for agriculture  in GATT.  In brief,  the U.S. proposal calls  for the
elimination of export subsidies  over a five year period, the phase out of
2trade-distorting domestic programs, and the  conversion of nontariff
barriers,  such as quotas, to  tariffs,  known as  "tariffication".
It may be useful  to  summarize in graphical form the conception
underlying the U.S. proposal  (see Runge, 1990, 1988).  In general, trade-
distorting measures may be thought of in terms of their effect on (a)
exports,  (b) imports and (c) output.  Tariff equivalents describe
distortions on the import side,  and subsidies on the export side.  Output
distortions resulting from internal policies are derived with respect to
their effect on production in domestic markets.  In each case, policies may
either promote or retard exports, imports,  or output.
With respect to exports, a policy has a distorting trade effect if
either buyers or  sellers  in the domestic market face different conditions
from those who participate  in the cross-border market.  Such a definition
encompasses not only policies  that affect the difference between export and
domestic prices, such as export taxes  and subsidies, but also non-price
protective barriers  such as voluntary export restraints.  As  shown in
Figure 1, such policies may distort trade either by artificially promoting
exports  (as  in the  case of  the U.S. Export Enhancement Program) or by
artificially retarding them (as in the  case of Argentine export taxes or
various countries' voluntary export restraints).  Over the remainder of the
Uruguay Round, the attempt will be to  define and to  set GATT-negotiated
limits,  for each country, on those policies that are definitely slated for
elimination, preferably as  soon as possible  ("Red Light"  policies);  those
that may remain in place in the short-run, but are  to be modified and
reformed during a transition phase  ("Yellow Light" policies);  and those
that are sufficiently non-distorting  to remain in place indefinitely
("Green Light" policies).
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6Similarly with respect  to imports,  a policy has a distorting trade
effect if either buyers or sellers in the domestic market face different
conditions from those who participate  in the cross-border market.  As shown
in Figure 2, policies that retard imports,  such as  quotas,  explicit
tariffs, or health, safety and other sanitary or phytosanitary
restrictions, are one side of such distortions.  On the other side  (less
frequently mentioned) are policies  that artificially promote  imports.  An
example might be environmental regulations on fruit and vegetable
production which prohibit the use  of certain cost-saving chemicals  in the
U.S.,  leading to  incentives  to  import foreign fruit and vegetables which
employ such practices.  Because  it  is quickly realized by domestic growers
that such regulations have this effect, calls for  import protection through
health and safety standards applied equally  to foreign produce are quickly
heard, converting the regulations from import-promoting to  import-retarding
policies (see Runge and Nolan, 1990).  In principle, either type of
distortion can be expressed as a tariff equivalent, with import promoting
policies defined as a negative tariff.  Once again, the  issue  is which
policies are determined to be definitely out-of-bounds  ("Red Light"),  which
are undesirable and to be phased out over time  ("Yellow Light")  and which
are acceptable  ("Green Light").
Finally, are those policies  that have an effect on domestic
production.  As  shown in Figure 3, such policies may be negative, such as
U.S. and European set-aside programs that pay farmers not to produce;  or
they may be positive, such as  price supports tied to specific  crop yields
and acres of production.  The  goal of U.S. domestic agricultural policy in
the Bush administration is  generally to  eliminate policies that are most
7distortive of production decisions  ("Red Light" policies),  including large
set-asides and high price supports, and to phase out  ("Yellow Light"
policies) those that have tended to distort production over time, such as
crop-specific acreage bases.  What remains  ("Green Light" policies) will be
programs in which farmers are relatively free  to plant whatever crops are
most in market demand, with support paid not to specific  crops, but on the
basis of some type of  income criteria.
Overall, progress in the present GATT negotiations can be defined in
terms of this framework.  Such progress depends on an agreement to
eliminate a specific set of  "Red Light" policies  in each realm (exports,
imports,  and output) with a well-defined timetable, and to  designate a set
of "Yellow Light" policies  for discussion in subsequent years.  It seems
inevitable that  successful negotiations will ultimately involve agreements
to  end specific policies, and that such political decisions  cannot be
finessed by an agreement simply to achieve an aggregate level of support or
level of tariff or subsidy.  This  is  the route  sometimes suggested by
advocates of a single aggregate measure,  such as  the  Producer Subsidy
Equivalent  (PSE).  As Hertel  (1989a, b) has recently shown, a given
reduction in the aggregate  level of support can be achieved with a myriad
of different options, many of which have extremely different effects on
exports,  imports and output.  His  analysis shows  that aggregate measures,
because they abstract from this  complexity, "underidentify" the problem,
and thus do not provide sufficient discipline to achieve  long lasting
reform.  The  PSE measure, whatever its virtues  as  an analytical device,
cannot be a substitute for the hard political  choices that accompany a
negotiation.
8How likely  is progress, given the proposals of the major negotiating
countries?  The  Cairns Group of fourteen agricultural exporters in
November, 1989, put forward a close cousin of  the U.S.  scheme.  The major
difference was the attention paid to  developing country interests
(reflecting the composition of the  Cairns Group) allowing greater
flexibility to  these countries in  implementing reforms.  In the context of
the framework described above, what  is red or yellow light  is  defined with
more leeway for developing countries.
The EC proposal has been interpreted in the U.S.  as continuing the
European tradition of conceding little and demanding much  in return.
However, close observers  of the  Brussels scene see more room for compromise
than meets the eye.  In particular, the  EC proposes to  give ground on the
possibility of  tariffication.  In a recent paper Stefan Tangermann (1990)
argues that due  in part to  the unfavorable ruling on the EC oilseed regime
rendered by a GATT panel  in December, 1989,  the  Community is  prepared to
make concessions which, in essence, reduce border protection through
tariffication in combination with "rebalancing".  What makes U.S.
negotiators suspicious  is  that the newfound EC commitment to tariffication
is vague and  is even contradicted in their proposal, while the commitment
to  "rebalancing"  is hard and fast.
"Rebalancing" means  that increases  in protection at  the border  for
oilseeds  (currently excepted under the  "zero duty binding") would be traded
for reduced levels of protection for grains.  All of  this  should be
measured, according to the EC proposal,  in "support measurement units".
While conceding some room for tariffication,  if tied to  rebalancing,  the
EC also demands  that U.S. deficiency payments be converted to  tariffs, and
9that EC  internal supply management be retained.  While cynics might see
little hope  that the Community is  ready to  compromise, Tangermann is
remarkably upbeat.
The significance of this  latest move of the  EC can hardly be
overestimated.  In essence it means that the  EC is  now willing to
consider fundamental changes to the way in which it operates  its
agricultural market regimes.  In particular, the variable  levy
system as such  is  no longer sacrosanct.  The  EC has thus  left its
long held negotiating corner and moved a very considerable step
towards  the center of the negotiating positions of the different
parties  (p. 5).
Before getting caught up  in this enthusiasm, it  is  chastening to note  (as
does Tangermann) that the proposal also states  that  "Basing protection
exclusively on customs  tariffs and envisaging, after a transitional period,
the reduction of these tariffs  to zero or a very low level, would lead to
trade  in agricultural products  on a totally free and chaotic basis."
What the EC means  is  thus  ambiguous, but can be interpreted as  support
for some tariffication,  less  than total.  Tangermann goes  on to propose a
modified tariff at time  (t),  MT  (t),  of form:
MT  (t) - FC  (t) + a  DIF  (t)
where FC  (t) is  the  "fixed" component of the tariff in year  (t) and DIF (t)
is  the  "floating" or differential component, which moves with world market
prices, as  the variable levy does now.  The parameter a  (0< a < 1)
determines  the "weight"  given to  the floating component, which would
become the focus  of negotiation, and might be set at 0.7  at  the beginning
of an adjustment period and perhaps 0.3  toward the end, moving closer to  a
fixed tariff (a  - 0) over time.  Such a framework could provide a mechanism
for fixed versus floating export subsidies  as well, which could then be
10walked down according to a schedule, consistent with red and yellow light
designations.
Tangermann argues that the EC's loss on the GATT oilseeds  panel
strengthens  the internal case in the Community for converting to
tariffication in the oilseeds sector as an alternative to current price
supports.  If so,  this  opens the possibility of a similar concession on the
part of the U.S.  in its  sugar quota regime, which was found unacceptable in
an earlier 1989 GATT panel.  In sum, the EC and U.S. have incentives  to  go
down the tariffication road together, designating the current EC oilseeds
and U.S. sugar policies as  "Red Light" and working toward "modified
tariffication" in tandem.
A final negotiating player  is Japan, which continues  to  let the  EC do
much of  its bidding, while gladly calling for the elimination of export
subsidies, since  its  agricultural sector exports little.  The center of
gravity of the Japanese proposal  is  "food security",  which is  used to
justify the continuation of border measures, exceedingly high internal
price supports, and a variety of nontariff barriers.
Given the continued divergence of views, what is likely to  emerge by
the end of 1990?
My conjecture is  that a framework agreement will be agreed to,  so long
as  it  commits the negotiating parties to  little actual reform.  To agree  to
designate policies as  "red light",  even to  agree to modified tariffication,
need not involve more than a commitment in principle.  This  is not the same
thing as  agricultural policy reform, which is ultimately a domestic
political issue.  The  EC can continue its own policies while agreeing in
principle to sort them out over time.  Similarly, Japan can use  "food
11security" as a blanket exemption for its  own most egregious distortions,
while agreeing in principle that, in some future period, reform will be
necessary along the  lines  of the  framework proposed.  This agreement to  a
framework may seem a hollow victory, but I regard it as a useful first
step.  I would not be surprised to see various contracting parties go
somewhat further, by each offering a sacrifice of some aspect of their own
policies  as an example of a "Red Light" distortion, primarily because  they
would like  to be rid of it for internal political reasons.  This is  the
case  in the soybeans-for-sugar trade  concessions mentioned above.
Assuming such a framework can be reached, and that  token sacrifices
might also be made,  is  there  any real prospect of substantive reforms?  I
would not bet on it, but if  it  occurs,  the core of such agreement must be a
decision on the part of the U.S.  to  reduce and eventually eliminate the
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and to reduce domestic levels of support,
in return for major European reductions  in export restitutions, as  well as
changes  in the variable levy.  On the U.S. side,  the EEP has been something
of a dog in financial terms,  despite the enthusiasm shown for it by
beneficiaries such as wheat growers.  Coughlin and Carraro  (1988)  noted
that the cost of EEP subsidies  for wheat averaged $4.08 per bushel,
compared with an average market price at the Gulf of $3.16,  implying that
it would have been cheaper to  destroy the wheat on the  farm and pay farmers
the difference than to  ship  it halfway around the world at  subsidy.
It would be nice to  sacrifice EEP, and to  reduce domestic supports,
purely for domestic budgetary reasons.  However, what will Europe
sacrifice?  Here,  the key  is again the "rebalancing" question.  European
sacrifices  of export restitutions in grains are possible, if  oilseeds can
12be given a measure of protection, perhaps through modified tariffication.
It is doubtful that such protection will be  too high, lest the  EC  livestock
industry protest the loss of cheap U.S. feed.  However, will the U.S.
soybean industry concede the need to  "close the CAP" further, losing  the
zero  duty binding, in return for gains  in the maize and wheat markets?  In
the Middle West, the answer may be yes, but the South's  soybean growers
have fewer options.  In sum, a core agreement between the U.S. and EC will
be difficult to achieve unless domestic interests provide  the requisite
political support.
The  Impact of the  1990 Farm Bill Debate
These domestic interests are now circling the wagons for  the  1990 Farm
Bill debate.  Many commodity groups,  and their elected representatives in
Congress,  seem unable  to  decide if GATT is  an ineffectual group of
diplomatic Dr. Jekylls,  or a threat to  farmers  capable of becoming a
monstrous Mr. Hyde.  The Congress bravely asserts that it  does not believe
in monsters, yet keeps peeking out from under its bed covers, just to make
sure.  On the  one hand, one hears that "GATT is  dead",  and that  the U.S.
must not continue to pay lipservice  to  an outmoded and toothless
institution.  This point of view is  held not only by xenophobes and
"America Firsters",  but also by such respected economists  as  Lester Thurow,
who is neither  (see Litan and Suchman, 1990).  On the other hand, one hears
that "We will not allow the Farm Bill to be written in Geneva".  Apart from
the  fact that the U.S. negotiators  (much less  their foreign counterparts)
would be unlikely voluntarily to come within miles  of farm legislation,
this worry suggests the  fear that GATT may have teeth after all.
The domestic farm legislation passed in 1990 will contain changes
13which support the U.S. position in GATT.  This support will come  in
positive reforms  that move modestly toward decoupling, and in negative
threats of retaliation if GATT is not a "success".  On the positive side,
the move toward flexibility is now widely popular.  "Flexibility" means
that farmers will be given greater leeway to plant a range of crops without
losing cropping "bases"  on which government program payments are made.  The
Administration proposal advocates return to  a Normal Crop Acreage or  "whole
farm" base, in which current bases for various  crops would be merged into
one  single accounting unit.  This approach has broad support, concentrated
especially in commodity groups  like the soybean, oats and barley growers,
who argue persuasively  that soybeans, oats and barley are  "crowded out" due
to high relative deficiency payments paid to corn and wheat.
Two recent reports illustrate  the reasoning behind increased
flexibility, which has  trade,  farm income and environmental components.
The  trade argument comes especially from the U.S. soybean sector, which
after being the predominant world supplier from the  1950s  through the
1970s,  lost substantial market share in the  1980s,  traceable  in part to
disincentives to grow soybeans  at the farm level,  and in part  to EC
subsidies.  Figure 4 illustrates oilseed planting trends, while  Figure 5
shows soybean and soybean meal exports.  Abel,  Daft and Earley  (1990)
summarize the domestic  farm income distortions  resulting  from current
programs.
During the 1986-89 period, target prices  for corn, sorghum,
rice, wheat, and cotton were comparatively high relative  to
various measures of production costs.  At the  other extreme,
average target prices for barley and oats were relatively low and
oilseeds did not have target prices.  These distortions
encouraged production of those  crops  that were most profitable
14Figure 4.  Oilseed Planting Trends.
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15Figure  5.  U.S.  Soybean  Exports  and  U.S.  Soybean  Meal  Exports.
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16when government payments are included and discouraged production
of less profitable crops, namely those with low or no target
prices.  There is  also a higher degree of certainty about revenue
from target price crops and this was important  to  some producers
and farm lenders during the mid-decade farm financial crisis  (pp.
12-13).
The  final justification for more flexible plantings is  an
environmental one  (Runge, et  al,  1990).  By encouraging more crop rotation
and green manures, less restrictive base acreage requirements would be
likely to lower  the repetitive cropping of highly erosive  crops with high
nutrient and pesticide demands.
In a comprehensive review of such a flexible  program, the
Congressional Budget Office  (CBO, 1989)  estimates that farm incomes would
fall slightly (as would government program costs),  but that  in  return,
farmers would be allowed much greater freedom to  pursue marketing
opportunities.  If program costs are to be cut anyway for broader budgetary
reasons, "flexibility"  affords an attractive way to  do it,  which is  in
effect an incremental  step toward decoupling, and thus  trade-liberalizing
overall.
In contrast to  flexibility, the  idea of tariffication has not gone
down well in Congress, for several reasons.  Most obviously, it  is an
unknown alternative to the well-known quantitative import restrictions
applied in the U.S.  sugar, dairy, peanut and tobacco programs, which have
served producers well.  At the political level,  the House and Senate
agriculture committees fear that conversion of quotas to  tariffs would
shift sovereignty over agricultural prices  to the  trade subcommittees, such
as  that of the House Ways and Means  Committee, where sympathy for consumers
far outweighs  that for farmers.  From a regional perspective, the
17commodities most affected by tariffication are concentrated in the South
and upper Midwest, where enthusiasm for trade liberalization is  less  than
on the coasts.  Combining tariffication with Southern soybean interests'
opposition to rebalancing adds up to  a powerful Southern bloc likely to
oppose a substantive compromise between the U.S. and EC that  includes  too
much tariffication or rebalancing.
Ironically, there  is  reason to believe that at least some of these
U.S. producers might actually be better off under tariffs than quotas,
assuming that the fixed component of such tariffs was  set at high levels
to begin with and only reduced through formulae  determined by multilateral
agreement, which would proceed slowly.  Beet sugar growers  in the Red River
Valley of the Dakotas and Minnesota, for example, are low cost producers
who are increasingly undercut by sugar processors  such as  candy
manufacturers who have made use of free trade  zones or  foreign subsidiaries
to  avoid using high-priced U.S. sugar.  A tariff wall would more
effectively insulate these  growers, while producing tariff revenues  and
rewarding their low costs.  The primary fear of beet growers  is  that
admitting the feasibility of tariff protection will be  a slippery slope
toward freer trade which  is worse than the  slope down which they are now
sliding.  However, an agreement based on the formulas proposed by
Tangermann  (1990),  cited above, might help to  allay these fears.
These  fears have a negative side which is also likely  to enter the
Farm Bill in the form of authorized retaliation if  the GATT talks  do not
"succeed",  the  same approach that has characterized the use of EEP as  a
"bargaining chip".  What counts as  "success",  like beauty, is  in the eye of
the beholder, and how Congress defines  the trigger that sets off such
18retaliation will be  important.  Opponents of GATT will want a hair-
trigger, while supporters will want a soft one.  It would appear that the
U.S. Trade Representatives and U.S. Department of Agriculture will concede
such triggers as part of the Farm Bill,  on the theory that  it keeps
Congress busy doing something they like  (posturing as tough traders),  while
apparently upping the ante for a successful GATT outcome.  It  is  important
to note that authorizing such retaliation is not the same as appropriating
money  to undertake it,  and such funds are  likely to be scarce  in the
current budget climate.
A final dimension in the  1990 Farm Bill debate is  the rising influence
of environmental interest groups.  While there  is  little connection between
these  groups and trade talks  on first inspection, I believe  that the
increasingly important role of health, safety and environmental concerns
may well be of larger significance for world trade than any of the  issues
thus far discussed.  The full  impact of these  trends will not be felt until
after the Uruguay Round.  But I contend that especially if import
protection  in traditional agricultural programs can be seriously addressed,
a new form  is likely  to take  its place, which  is  inherently much more
difficult to  isolate and thus  to "tariffy".  I call this market access
issue the rise of "ecoprotectionism".
EcoDrotectionism and Future Trade Negotiations
I conclude  this  review with a brief discussion of ecoprotectionism, by
which I mean the use  of health, safety and environmental regulations as
effective barriers to  trade  (see Runge  and Nolan, 1990).
Ecoprotectionism involves the  internationalization of  issues  related
to  food, health and safety.  This gives rise to problems created by
19national income disparities and the different priorities of national
governments.  A recent U.S./Canada dispute over salmon and herring exports
provides legal precedents for future international actions, which will
involve GATT in a multi-tiered set of international standards  that can help
distinguish legitimate health and environmental regulations  from disguised
nontariff barriers.
On January 1, 1989,  the  European Community (EC) announced a ban on all
beef imports from the United States  containing hormones used to help
increase cattle growth.  Citing health risks,  the  EC action touched off a
cycle of retaliation worth hundreds  of millions  of dollars that has
affected the world trading system, and is  still being negotiated.  This
apparently isolated example of health regulations  acting as trade barriers
is part of an emerging pattern of environmental and health issues with
major consequences for the world economy.
In September, 1989,  the European Commission took up discussions of
further rules to restrict  imports of cattle or dairy products produced with
the bovine growth hormone BST (bovine somatotropin).  BST is also at  the
center of domestic controversies over the  safety of food supplies  in the
U.S.  and Canada.
Senator Pete Wilson (R-CA), a candidate for governor of California,
introduced federal legislation in December, 1989  that would ban companies
from exporting pesticides that are  illegal in the U.S.  Responding to  the
Western Growers Association, Wilson stated that  "export of dangerous
pesticides creates a competitive  inequity between foreign and American
farmers and growers."  A spokesperson for the growers argued that "we are
under extreme pressure from foreign farmers,"  noting hundreds of growers
who have gone out of business because of competition with Mexico and other
20countries where  "they can use whatever  [chemicals]  they want in most
cases."
In October 1989 a dispute settlement panel formed under the
U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement  (FTA) determined that Canadian
restrictions on foreign salmon and herring fishing constituted an
effective barrier to  trade, despite  the  fact that Canada justified them as
environmentally motivated conservation measures under Article XX of GATT.
These examples are part of an emerging pattern in which environmental
and health risks are increasingly traded among nations along with goods  and
services.  These risks are the  opposite of services--they are environmental
and health disservices traded across national borders.  They arise directly
from the  transfer of technology, and will increasingly affect international
investment flows,  trade and development, and the relative competitiveness
of national  industries and agriculture.
This pattern of trade underscores the problem of formulating
government policies  in an interdependent world economy.  While  the United
States  and other signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
pursue more open borders  in the ongoing Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, the role of national health, safety and environmental
regulations grows  in importance  for domestic electorates, especially in the
wealthy countries of the North.  Increasingly, different national
regulatory priorities will pose problems for trade harmonization, blurring
the distinction between domestic and foreign economic policy.  Without
additional attempts to  come  to  terms with environmental issues  through
multilateral institutions such as GATT, differences in national regulatory
approaches will bedevil both the environment and the trade system in the
next decade and beyond.
21The examples  cited above demonstrate that environmental regulations
are not purely domestic policy issues.  Indeed, there has been longstanding
recognition of the possibility for conflicts between national environmental
policy and more liberal  international trade.  The GATT articles,  adopted by
the contracting parties  in 1947, explicitly recognize  the possibility that
domestic health, safety and environmental policies might override general
attempts  to  lower trade barriers  (Jackson, 1969).  GATT Article XI, headed
"General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,"  states  in paragraph (1):
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,  taxes or
other changes, whether made effective  through quotas,  import or
export licenses or other measures,  shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of  the territory of any contracting party or on the
exportation or sale  for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
Yet Article XX, headed  "General Exceptions,"  provides
... nothing in the Agreement shall be  construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contacting party of measures:
...(g) relating to  the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures  are made effective  in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
provided that such measures:
...are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail,  or a disguised
restriction on international  trade.
22A similar set of exceptions was applied to health related measures
under Article XX (b).  GATT law emphasizes that any restrictions imposed on
foreign practices for environmental or health reasons must also reflect a
domestic  commitment, so that the exception cannot be misused as a
disguised form of protection.
Despite substantial attention to both technical standards and
nontariff barriers in the Uruguay Round it  is  still unclear when and where
such standards constitute an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.
Although a GATT technical working group on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures continues its  work, if anything, the temptation to use
environmental and health standards  to deny access to home markets is
stronger now than in the  1980s.  As the European Community moves towards
its  goal of market integration in 1992,  it will have strong incentives to
create common regulations for  internal purposes, but to  impose restrictions
vis-a-vis the rest of the world.  A similar propensity may occur as a
result of harmonization under the U.S./Canada free  trade agreement.  Even
if national standards can be harmonized, moreover, there  is every reason to
expect subnational jurisdictions  to utilize various health and environmental
standards  to protect certain markets.
Underlying the development of these  trade tensions are  fundamental
differences in the views of developed and developing countries  (the "North"
and "South") concerning the appropriate  level and extent of environmental
regulation.  Differences  in the domestic policy response  to  these problems
are well represented in the food systems of the North and South.  Since so
much recent attention has focused on food and agricultural chemical use in
the North, and because the agricultural sector is of key importance in almost
all developing economies of the  South, it provides  a useful case  in point.
23In the developed countries of North America and Western Europe,  the
"food problem" arises not from too little food and land in production, but
generally too much.  As predicted by Engels' Law, the incomes of developed
countries have increased, and the  share of this income  spent on food has
fallen in proportion to other goods and services.  This  characteristic
makes food an "inferior good"  in economics jargon.  In contrast,
environmental quality and health concerns have grown in importance with
increasing income levels.  They are what economists call "superior goods,"
in the sense that they play a larger role in the national budget as
national  incomes  increase  (see Runge, 1987).
The competitiveness  implications of these trends  are not lost on
Northern producers.  They have been quick to  see the trade relevance of
environmental and health standards.  Growing consumer concerns with the
health and environmental impacts of agriculture create  a natural  (and much
larger) constituency for nontariff barriers to  trade, justified in the name
of health and safety.  As between countries  in the  North, obvious
differences  in values also exist, although the regulatory gap is  less
yawning.
Given the  tensions  separating North and South, and the lesser
differences between countries  in the North, it would appear that a single
set of standards is unlikely to be  successful.  The Subsidies  Code adopted
during the Tokyo Round is  at least a necessary starting point, but some
mechanism must be found to accommodate differences  in national priorities
linked to levels of economic development and cultural factors.
How might such standards be developed?  Consider a 1989 case heard by
a panel convened under the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement  (McRae, et al.,
1989).  The case involved a panel established to hear testimony over
24Canadian restrictions on exports of Pacific Coast unprocessed salmon and
herring.  Such restrictions date  to 1908, but were found GATT-illegal  in
1987 after the United States complained that they were unjustifiable
restrictions on trade.  In 1988,  Canada accepted the GATT finding, but
stated that it would continue a "landing"  requirement for  foreign boats
that would allow inspection of their catch.  The ostensible reason for the
requirement was  an environmental one:  to  allow the fish harvest to be
counted and monitored so as to preserve the  fishery from overexploitation.
According to  the U.S.,  the requirement that  its boats must land in
Canada constituted an export restriction, because of the extra time and
expense U.S. buyers must incur in landing and unloading, as well as due to
dockage  fees and product deterioration.  The Canadians held that they were
pursuing "conservation and management goals"  for five varieties of salmon
(some of which had previously not been covered by the  landing requirement)
as well as herring.  The  Canadians justified their action under Article XX
of the GATT  (the "General Exceptions" section noted above) by appealing to
an environmental claim under Article XX(g):  conservation of exhaustible
natural resources.
The U.S. argued that although the new herring and salmon regulations
"are carefully worded to avoid the appearance  of creating direct export
prohibitions or restrictions, their clear effect  is  to restrict exports"
(McRae, et al.,  p. 13).  Moreover, the Canadian landing requirement was
argued not to be "primarily aimed" at  the conservation of herring and
salmon stocks, which had been the interpretation given to Article XX(g) by
the  1987 GATT ruling.  Thus,  the U.S. held that the Canadian landing
requirement was an environmental policy acting as  a disguised restriction
on international trade.  Canada argued that the landing requirement was
25"primarily aimed" at the conservation of the salmon and herring fisheries.
In a significant decision, the panel found that if the effect of such
a measure is  to  impose "a materially greater commercial burden on exports
than on domestic sales,"  it  amounted to  a restriction on trade, whether or
not its  trade effects could be quantitatively demonstrated.  The Panel  "was
satisfied that the cost of complying with the landing requirement would be
more than an insignificant expense for those buyers who would have
otherwise shipped directly from the  fishing ground to a landing site in the
United States"  (McRae et al.,  p. 25).  With regard to  the Article XX(g)
exception, the Panel was  conscious "of the need to  allow governments
appropriate latitude  in implementing their conservation policies,"  and that
the  trade  interests of one  state should not be  allowed to  override  the
"legitimate environmental concerns of another"  (p. 29).  "If the measure
would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone,"  the Panel found,
"Article XX(g) permits a government the freedom to  employ it."  However,
balancing this  is the  "primarily aimed at"  test, which determines whether
the measure is part of a genuine conservation or environmental policy, or
is  in fact a disguised barrier to  trade.
This  line of reasoning led the Panel to  two conclusions.  First,
"since governments do not adopt conservation measures unless the benefits
to conservation are worth the costs,"  the magnitude  of costs  to  the
parties--foreign and domestic--who actually bear them must be examined.
Second, "how genuine the  conservation purpose of a measure is,  must be
determined by whether the government would have been prepared to  adopt that
measure  if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure"
(McRae, p. 31,  emphasis added).  In this case, the Panel was unconvinced
that the measure would have been imposed on all Canadian boats primarily
26for conservation reasons.  Specifically, the Panel found that Canada would
not have adopted such a measure "if  it had required an equivalent number of
Canadian buyers to land and unload elsewhere  than at their intended
destination"  (p. 32).  Alternative methods of monitoring catch rates were
available which posed far fewer restrictions on trade.
Generalizing from this  case, it  seems possible to  envision the
development of criteria based on  (a)  estimated costs  of health, safety and
environmental regulations;  (b) evidence on who bears  these costs;  and (c)
judgments of whether such measures would be imposed in the absence of any
trade effects.  Such criteria can serve  as  a basis for the development of
standards determining which environmental and health measures constitute
unnecessary obstacles  to  trade.
In view of differences in levels  of economic development and national
priorities,  it  is  clear that such standards cannot be wholly uniform.
Jeffrey James,  in The Economics  of New Technology in Developing Countries
(1982),  suggests  that despite valid arguments for  improved health and
environmental regulations  in the South,  "it does not follow from this that
countries  of the Third World should adopt either the  same number or  the same
level of standards  as developed countries."  James  suggests what may be
called intermediate standards,  "in  the  same sense and for the  same basic
reason as that which underlies  the widespread advocacy of inter-mediate
technology in the Third World."  This does not imply a "downgrading" of
U.S. regulations, but an "upgrading" of LDC norms,  together with
recognition that the social costs of regulation are relative to national
income.
Under GATT law, these distinctions are  recognized as  "Special and
Differential Treatment" of  lower income countries.  While "S&D"  often
27creates  serious longrun distortions, the  terms under which  it  is granted,
as James emphasizes, may actually reduce current regulatory differentials
by raising norms  in the South, thus  improving Third World environmental
policies.  While  this may not satisfy all competing producers in the North,
it can contribute to  reductions in overall trade tension while  improving
environmental quality in the South.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed three  somewhat disparate  elements of the
Uruguay Round negotiations  in agriculture.  I have argued that a framework
agreement on general principles will be reached, against a background of
agricultural policies  in the U.S.  in which Farm Bill decisions are made
primarily for domestic reasons.  Domestic U.S.  interests  are not likely to
give GATT much leeway, and are  threatened by many elements of the
negotiation, notably "tariffication" and "rebalancing".  Despite  these
fears,  I expect an eventual compromise which will move us modestly  in the
direction of trade reform.  However,  there are growing threats  to more
liberal  international trade arising from new sources that will demand
attention.  These include rising concern over health, safety and
environmental quality, which can be turned easily into restrictions on
market access.
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